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a  b  s  t r  a  c  t
The  estimation  of price  elasticities  of  alcohol  demand  is valuable  for the  appraisal  of price-based  policy
interventions such  as  minimum  unit  pricing  and  taxation.  This  study  applies  a pseudo-panel  approach
to the  cross-sectional  Living  Cost  and Food Survey  2001/2–2009  to  estimate  the  own-  and  cross-price
elasticities of  off- and on-trade  beer,  cider,  wine,  spirits  and  ready-to-drinks  in the  UK.  A pseudo-panel
with 72  subgroups  defined  by  birth  year, gender  and  socioeconomic  status  is constructed.  Estimated  own-
price elasticities  from  the  base  case  fixed  effect  models  are  all negative  and  mostly  statically  significant
(p < 0.05).  Off-trade  cider  and  beer  are  most  elastic  (−1.27  and  −0.98)  and  off-trade  spirits  and  on-trade
ready-to-drinks are  least  elastic  (−0.08  and  −0.19).  Estimated  cross-price  elasticities  are  smaller  in mag-
nitude with  a  mix  of positive  and  negative  signs.  The  results  appear  plausible  and  robust and  could  be
used for  appraising  the  estimated  impact  of  price-based  interventions  in  the UK.18
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. Introduction
The consumption of alcohol and the related health and social
arms  are an issue of extensive policy debate in the UK and
any  other countries. Price-based policy interventions, such as
inimum unit pricing and increases in taxation, have been actively
onsidered  by the UK and Scottish governments who aim to reduce
armful  alcohol consumption and consequently various alcohol
elated  harms among the population (HM Government, 2012). The
stimation of price elasticities of alcohol demand is essential for
he  appraisal of such price-based policy interventions, because
hey  link the prices of alcohol, which these interventions directly
ffect,  and the demand for alcohol, which such interventions aim
o reduce.
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Open access under CC BY license. It is important to estimate elasticities for different beverage
ypes (e.g., beer vs. wine) and different trade sectors (off-trade
.g.,  supermarkets vs. on-trade e.g., pubs) for policy appraisals
ecause differential consumer preferences mean elasticities may
ary across these categories and because prices and taxes are dif-
erent for the different beverage types and sectors. Since changes in
he price of one beverage type/sector could affect demand for oth-
rs, it is also important to estimate both own-price and cross-price
lasticities. That is, we aim to estimate own-price elasticities to
nable us to quantify the percentage change in the demand for one
ype of alcohol due to a 1% change in the price of this type of alco-
ol,  and cross-price elasticities to quantify the percentage change
n  demand for one type of alcohol due to a 1% change in the price of
nother type of alcohol. The cross-price elasticities estimated also
llow us to identify whether two  types of alcohol of interest are
ubstitutes  (i.e., positive sign) or complements (i.e., negative sign).
Previous meta-analyses have focused on differential elastic-
ties  by beverage type and demonstrate that beer, wine and
pirits  have different own-price elasticities, with beer appearing
o  be less elastic than wine and spirits (Fogarty, 2010; Gallet,
007;  Wagenaar et al., 2009). Cross-price elasticities, especially
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etween off- and on-trade, are less widely studied. Previous studies
uggested that different beverage types can be either substitutes or
omplements (Huang, 2003; Ogwang and Cho, 2009; Ruhm et al.,
012); whilst off-trade purchasing and on-trade-purchasing were
ypically substitutes, albeit with some exceptions (Collis et al.,
010; Huang, 2003; Purshouse et al., 2010). Few UK studies have
nvestigated cross-price elasticities between off- and on-trade alco-
ol. Huang et al. examined own- and cross-price elasticities for 4
everage categories (off-trade beer, on-trade beer, wine and spir-
ts) using aggregate time series data in the UK from 1970 to 2002
Huang, 2003). Collis et al. used a Tobit approach to model own-
nd cross-price elasticities for 10 beverage categories (off- and on-
rade beer, cider, wine, spirits and ready-to-drinks (RTDs)) using
ousehold-level repeated cross-sectional data (the Living Cost and
ood Survey, or LCF) in the UK from 2001/2 to 2006 (Collis et al.,
010). When modelling the effects of minimum unit pricing for
lcohol, Purshouse et al. used the same cross-sectional data to esti-
ate own- and cross-price elasticities for 16 beverage categories
off- and on-trade beer, wine, spirits and RTDs, further split by high-
nd low-priced) using an iterative three-stage least squares regres-
ion on a system of 17 simultaneous equations (Purshouse et al.,
010). A recent study examined long-run own- and cross-price
lasticities specifically for off- and on-trade beer using aggregate
ime series data from 1982 to 2010 (Tomlinson and Branston,
014). The key methodological limitation of these studies is the
se of either national aggregate time series data which has the
roblem of small numbers of observations and lack of granular-
ty (thus restricting the number and type of parameters which can
e estimated) or cross-sectional data which potentially has severe
ndogeneity problems. The ideal data source would be longitu-
inal panel data where individuals or households have repeated
bservations on both purchases and prices paid over time. Such
ndividual-level panel data would have the advantage that individ-
als themselves can be used as controls to account for unobserved
eterogeneity between individuals and stronger causal inferences
an be made. However, individual-level panel data is generally
ore difficult and costly to obtain than cross-sectional or aggre-
ate time series data. Compared to repeated cross-sectional data,
t also suffers more from nonresponse and attrition and normally
as smaller sample size and shorter time series.
One solution to the lack of UK individual-level panel data is
o use repeat cross-sectional data to construct a pseudo-panel. A
seudo-panel is constructed so that population subgroups rather
han individuals become the unit of analysis. Subgroups are defined
y a set of characteristics (e.g. birth year, gender, ethnicity) which
o not change or remain broadly constant over time. It is assumed
hat although the individuals within groups change between waves
f cross-sectional surveys, the group itself can be viewed as a con-
istent panel ‘member’ over time. Different ways to define the
ubgroups of the pseudo-panel can be tested, for example hav-
ng larger numbers of groups with each having a smaller sample
ize but greater within-group homogeneity, or smaller numbers of
roups with each having a bigger sample size but more within-
roup heterogeneity. Standard techniques for analysing panel data
re then applied (Deaton, 1985; Moffitt, 1993; Verbeek, 2008;
erbeek and Vella, 2005). The pseudo-panel approach has been
pplied in many empirical studies estimating elasticities of demand
or various goods (e.g. Dargay and Vythoulkas, 1999), however, it
as not been used to estimate elasticities of alcohol demand.
This study aims to apply the pseudo-panel approach using the
CF data from 2001/2 to 2009 to estimate the own- and cross-price
lasticities of 10 categories of beverage (off- and on-trade sepa-
ated for beer, cider, wine, spirits and RTDs) in the UK. The key
esearch questions are (1) What are the own- and cross-price elas-
icities for different types of alcohol in the UK? (2) How do the
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stimates compare with previous estimates from the literature?
3) How robust are these estimates to different model specifications
nd alternative constructions of the pseudo-panel.
. Methods
.1. Data
The LCF, previously known as the Expenditure and Food Sur-
ey, is a national UK survey sponsored by the Office for National
tatistics (ONS) and the Department for Environment, Food and
ural Affairs (DEFRA). The LCF is a cross-sectional survey of pri-
ate households, collecting information on purchasing at both
he household and individual level. Data on the purchasing of
on-durable goods including alcohol is collected via a confiden-
ial two-week personal diary for individuals aged 16 and over. In
he UK, around 12,000 households per year are selected and the
esponse rate is typically just over 50%. At the time of the analysis,
CF data was available for the 9 years from 2001 to 2009 (finan-
ial years were used for LCF 2001/2 to 2005/6 and this changed to
alendar years from 2006) covering 107,763 individuals in 57,646
ouseholds in the UK. We  obtained the datasets from the UK Data
rchive at the University of Essex and detailed data sources are
isted in Appendix 1.
Individual-level quantities of alcohol purchased are not avail-
ble in the standard version of the dataset. However, via a special
ata request to DEFRA, we obtained anonymised individual-level
iary data on both expenditure (in pence) and quantity (in millil-
tres of product, e.g., 330 ml  of beer) for 25 types of alcohol, e.g.,
ff-trade lagers and continental beers (see Appendix 2 for com-
lete list). For this analysis, the 25 types of alcohol were grouped
nto 10 categories (off- and on-trade separated for beer, cider, wine,
pirits and RTDs). The spending during the diary period and the cor-
esponding purchase level (measured in units of alcohol, where 1
nit equals 10 ml  of ethanol in the UK) were derived for each of the
0 categories of alcohol for each individual. Alcohol units were cal-
ulated by multiplying the recorded volume of product (e.g., 330 ml
f beer) and the alcohol by volume (ABV) for each of the 25 beverage
ypes (see Appendix 2 for ABV assumptions). For each individual,
ean pence per unit paid (PPU) was calculated for each beverage
ype by dividing the total spending by the total units purchased.
utliers were defined as individuals who pay extremely high or
ow PPU for any of the 10 types of alcohol (above 99.5th or below
.5th percentile of the distributions) and were excluded from the
nalysis.
.2. Constructing the pseudo-panel
It is important that the subgroups in a pseudo-panel are defined
y characteristics that are time-invariant such as the year of birth,
ender and ethnicity (Verbeek, 2008). A trade-off also needs to
e considered when deciding the number of subgroups (denoted
y C) in a pseudo-panel: a larger C increases the heterogeneity
f the pseudo-panel by increasing the variations between sub-
roups, but also decreases the average number of individuals per
ubgroup (denoted by nc) resulting in less precise estimates of
he subgroup means. Given a fixed total number N of individuals
n the repeated cross-sectional dataset over time periods T, by
efinition, N = C × nc × T (for a balanced panel where every panel
ember has observation for every time period) or N = C × nc × T*
for an unbalanced panel where some panel members have miss-
ng observations for some time periods), where T* represents the
ean number of repeated observations per subgroups. A large nc
s important for the necessary asymptotic theory to be applicable
o the pseudo-panel approach (Moffitt, 1993; Verbeek and Vella,
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Table 1
Characteristics of the 72 subgroups in the pseudo-panel in the base case.
Birth year Gender Higher socioeconomic group Middle socioeconomic group Lower socioeconomic group
Number of
repeated
observationsa
Mean number of
individuals per
yearb (Min, Max)
Number of
repeated
observationsa
Number of
individuals per
yearb (Min, Max)
Number of
repeated
observationsa
Number of
individuals per
yearb (Min, Max)
1930–1934 Male 8 (0) 3.0 (1, 5) 9 (9) 254.6 (227, 295) 9 (0) 8.7 (5, 14)
1935–1939 Male 9 (0) 9.4 (6, 21) 9 (9) 279.0 (255, 306) 9 (3) 23.8 (9, 47)
1940–1944 Male 9 (4) 26.1 (7, 42) 9 (9) 273.9 (199, 322) 9 (8) 59.0 (27, 104)
1945–1949 Male 9 (9) 55.7 (39, 68) 9 (9) 309.2 (242, 337) 9 (9) 89.3 (75, 108)
1950–1954 Male 9 (9) 69.4 (54, 88) 9 (9) 279.0 (260, 308) 9 (9) 82.9 (69, 100)
1955–1959 Male 9 (9) 88.3 (74, 109) 9 (9) 279.2 (250, 313) 9 (9) 84.3 (73, 95)
1960–1964 Male 9 (9) 91.0 (70, 105) 9 (9) 328.4 (291, 353) 9 (9) 98.2 (75, 132)
1965–1969 Male 9 (9) 96.3 (86, 111) 9 (9) 311.8 (288, 365) 9 (9) 97.9 (76, 113)
1970–1974 Male 9 (9) 86.1 (63, 107) 9 (9) 270.6 (243, 292) 9 (9) 89.8 (73, 104)
1975–1979 Male 9 (9) 58.7 (42, 91) 9 (9) 225.6 (196, 260) 9 (9) 75.3 (59, 91)
1980–1984 Male 9 (9) 39.7 (31, 50) 9 (9) 226.1 (203, 275) 9 (9) 85.8 (66, 108)
1985–1989 Male 9 (6) 34.4 (9, 51) 9 (9) 209.1 (72, 281) 9 (8) 86.2 (15, 111)
1930–1934 Female 9 (0) 2.8 (1, 4) 9 (9) 290.9 (217, 354) 9 (0) 9.7 (5, 16)
1935–1939 Female 9 (0) 7.2 (3, 14) 9 (9) 324.1 (274, 373) 9 (1) 17.1 (7, 30)
1940–1944 Female 9 (0) 18.4 (10, 28) 9 (9) 311.1 (265, 391) 9 (7) 44.1 (16, 96)
1945–1949 Female 9 (8) 43.3 (28, 67) 9 (9) 361.9 (291, 424) 9 (9) 91.2 (57, 128)
1950–1954 Female 9 (9) 63.0 (56, 71) 9 (9) 296.1 (265, 330) 9 (9) 96.0 (87, 109)
1955–1959 Female 9 (9) 83.0 (61, 99) 9 (9) 303.9 (291, 333) 9 (9) 95.0 (79, 119)
1960–1964 Female 9 (9) 94.7 (84, 116) 9 (9) 357.1 (301, 408) 9 (9) 113.3 (85, 136)
1965–1969 Female 9 (9) 97.1 (82, 110) 9 (9) 366.1 (326, 419) 9 (9) 114.4 (100, 149)
1970–1974 Female 9 (9) 88.1 (71, 113) 9 (9) 316.1 (295, 339) 9 (9) 109.9 (88, 144)
1975–1979 Female 9 (9) 66.9 (47, 96) 9 (9) 274.2 (241, 306) 9 (9) 88.0 (72, 106)
1980–1984 Female 9 (9) 43.1 (31, 60) 9 (9) 264.6 (229, 284) 9 (9) 103.7 (82, 134)
1985–1989 Female 9 (4) 32.1 (12, 51) 9 (9) 208.3 (58, 325) 9 (8) 90.2 (25, 115)
Summary 9.0 (6.5) 54.1 9.0 (9.0) 288.4 9.0 (7.5) 77.2
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ta Value in bracket is the number of repeated observations where the number of i
b Values in bracket are the minimum and maximum number of individuals withi
005) and previous empirical applications of the pseudo-panel
pproach normally have nc over 100 (Verbeek, 2008).
In the base case, a pseudo-panel with 72 subgroups was  defined
y 12 birth cohorts (born between year 1930–1934, and subsequent
 year intervals, until 1985–1989), gender and 3 socioeconomic
roups – higher, middle and lower (see Appendix 3 for definitions).
he resulting average number of individuals per subgroup, or nc, is
40 with N = 90,652, C = 72 and T = 9. Table 1 summarises the char-
cteristics of the subgroups. Subgroup observations with less than
0 individuals were excluded from the analysis to ensure robust
stimates of subgroup mean statistics. For example, for the panel
ember of lower-income males who were born between 1940 and
944, 5 out of 9 observations were excluded (see Table 1).
Three alternative ways to construct subgroups were tested in
ensitivity analysis: 96 subgroups defined by birth cohorts, gender
nd 4 socioeconomic groups (a separate student/other category),
8 subgroups defined by birth cohorts, gender and 2 regions in
he UK (England and rest of UK), and 96 subgroups defined by
irth cohorts, gender and 4 regions in the UK (Southern England
ncluding London, Scotland, Northern Ireland and rest of UK).
.3. Adjustment to prices, income and consumption
The monthly retail price index (RPI) in the UK was used to derive
eal term prices of alcohol and income, with December 2009 cho-
en as the base period (Office for National Statistics, 2012). The
ncome variable used in this study is the household gross weekly
ncome which has been consistently collected in the LCF from
001/2 to 2009. Alcohol consumption or purchasing estimated
rom self-reported survey data generally suffers from underreport-
ng (Stockwell et al., 2004). Compared to the UK sales clearance
ata, the coverage of the LCF ranges from 55% to 66% over the period
001 to 2009 (HM Revenue and Customs, 2012). We  estimated bev-
rage specific coverage rates for each year and applied these factors
y
yuals within a subgroup at a year equals or bigger than 30.
bgroup over the 9 years.
o adjust the alcohol purchase quantities for each individual in the
CF (see Appendix 4 for the adjustment factors and details of how
hey were applied).
.4. Dependent and independent variables
For each observation of each subgroup (e.g., higher income male
orn 1960–1964 in the year 2009), the mean units purchased of the
0 types of alcohol, denoted by Cijt, was  used as the dependent vari-
ble, where i and j represent the subgroup and the type of alcohol
espectively, and t represents the time period.
The main independent variables are the mean PPUs for the
0 beverage types which are specific to each subgroup and time
eriod, denoted by Pijt, and subgroup’s mean income, denoted
ncomeit. Four other time-variant independent variables were also
ested, namely the proportion of individuals having children, being
arried, being unemployed, and smoking, denoted by KIDit, MRDit,
NEit, and SMKit respectively. Year dummies were included to con-
rol for the annual trend and any potentially omitted independent
ariables that change linearly over time (e.g., mean age of the sub-
roup). The square of the mean age of subgroup was also tested to
ccount for a potentially non-linear relationship between alcohol
urchase and age.
.5. Model specification and testing
Three commonly used models for analysing panel data were
ested: fixed effects models (FEMs), random effects models (REMs)
nd standard ordinary least squares (OLS) models which are illus-
rated in Eqs. (1)–(3) respectively (Wooldridge, 2009).it = xit  ˇ + ai + εit (FEMs) (1)
it = xit  ˇ + xi + ai + εit (REMs) (2)
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j = xj  ˇ + εj (OLS) (3)
here yit is the dependent variables, i and t represent individual
 and the time of observation t, xit is a vector of time-variant vari-
bles, xi is a vector of time-invariant variables,  ˇ to  are parameter
ectors, ai is the unobserved individual effect specific to individual
, and εit is the error term. For OLS, yj and xj are the dependent and
 vector of independent variables where j is a composite of i and t
e.g., a panel data set with i = 100 and t = 5 will result a j = 500), and
j is the error term.
REMs assume no correlation between unobserved individual
ffect and independent variables, i.e., Corr(xit,ai) = 0 ; Corr(xi, ai) = 0,
nd FEMs allow for arbitrary correlation between the individual
ffect and independent variables. In this study, the individual effect
efers to the specific effect for each defined subgroup in the pseudo-
anel. It has been argued that FEMs are the natural choice for
seudo-panel data when subgroup averages are based on a large
umber of individuals (Verbeek and Vella, 2005). The Hausman
est was used to test whether the underlying correlation structure
avoured the assumption of either FEMs or REMs. OLS models do
ot account for the longitudinal nature of the data and were tested
nly for comparative purposes. Models were fitted separately for
ach type of alcohol.
In this study it was assumed that the adjustment of alcohol
emand following changes to prices does not take longer than one
ear to occur. Therefore, the models estimated are static and do not
nclude lagged dependent variables. It was also assumed that habit
ersistence and any long-term changes in alcohol-related prefer-
nces would be captured by the year and birth cohort dummies (for
EMs and OLS models). Birth cohort dummies were not included
n FEMs which cannot take time-invariant variables. The standard
og–log functional form for the dependent variable and indepen-
ent variables of PPU and income was applied. Other independent
ariables were tested as levels (i.e., in its original measurement
nd not logged). t-tests and F-tests were used to test the inclu-
ion/exclusion of non-PPU/income independent variables. As an
llustration, the unrestricted FEM for off-trade beer (i.e., j = off-trade
eer) is presented in Eq. (4). Regarding the models for the other 9
ypes of alcohol, the independent variables are identical to those in
q. (4), with the dependent variable changing to the type of alcohol
f interest (e.g., InC(officider)it).
n C(offbeer)it = ˇ1 ln P(offbeer)it + ˇ2 ln P(offcider)it + ˇ3 ln P(offw
+ ˇ7 ln P(oncider)it + ˇ8 ln P(onwine)it + ˇ9 ln P(on
+ ˇ14UNEit + ˇ15SMKit + ˇ16Age2it + YearDummie
here, ai is the unobserved fixed effects specific to subgroup i,
1–ˇ10 represent the own- and cross-price elasticities for the bev-
rage type of interest (e.g., in Eq. (4), ˇ1 represents own-price
lasticity for off-trade beer, while ˇ2–ˇ10 represent cross-price
lasticities for off-trade beer).
All models were fitted using the STATA/SE 12.1 software (Stat-
Corp, College Station, TX). To account for the different size of the
ubgroups, weighted FEMs and OLS models were applied using the
ean number of individuals within a subgroup, or nc, as weights.
. Results
.1. Model selection
Hausman tests indicate that correlation exists between the
ndependent variables and unobserved individual effects for off-
rade beer and wine, and all five on-trade beverages at the 0.05
ignificance level (see Table 2). On this basis, we reject the null
ypothesis and conclude that the FEMs are more appropriate for
b
b
s
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+ ˇ4 ln P(offspirit)it + ˇ5 ln P(offRTD)it + ˇ6 ln P(onbeer)it
t)it + ˇ10 ln P(onRTD)it , ˇ11LnIncomeit + ˇ12KIDit+13MRDit
i + εit (4)
odelling this data. The choice of FEMs also agrees with previous
iterature (Verbeek and Vella, 2005). Table 2 summarises the esti-
ated coefficients, standard errors, and statistical test for the FEMs
or the 10 alcohol categories and Appendix 5-1 to 5-10 present and
ompare the results for FEMs, REMs and OLS models.
F-Tests suggested that non-PPU/income independent variables
re jointly significant for the majority of FEMs tested. The final cho-
en base case models were FEMs controlling for prices, income, year
ummies, age squared, and the proportions of individuals having
hildren, married, unemployed and smoking.
Correlation among the 10 price independent variables was
 concern and, if present, may  bias the model estimates. The
orrelation matrix was calculated and it shows only weak to mod-
rate correlations (ranging from −0.11 to 0.43, with an average of
.13).The comparison of results from FEMs, REMs and OLS mod-
ls suggest that different model specifications give broadly similar
stimates, both in terms of the positive/negative signs and their
tatistical significance. For example, the estimated own-price elas-
icities for off-trade beer range from −0.980 to −1.105 for the three
odel specifications with all estimates statistically significant.
.2. Estimated own- and cross-price elasticities
Estimated own- and cross-price elasticities for the 10 types of
lcohol are presented in Table 3 using the base case models.
The estimated own-price elasticities are all negative and 8 out of
0 are statistically significant; off-trade spirits and on-trade RTDs
eing the exception. The estimates range from −0.08 (off-trade
pirits) to −1.27 (off-trade cider). In the off-trade a wide range
f elasticities was seen with beer being most elastic (−0.98) after
ider, followed by RTDs (−0.59), wine (−0.38) and spirits (−0.08).
n the on-trade, elasticities are generally more similar across bev-
rage types, with spirits being most elastic (−0.89), followed by
ine (−0.87), beer (−0.79), cider (−0.59) and RTDs (−0.19). For
ine and spirits, the estimated own-price elasticities in the off-
rade are smaller than in the on-trade. The opposite is observed for
eer, cider and RTDs.
The estimated cross-price elasticities were a mix  of positive
nd negative signs (46 and 44 respectively) and only 6 out of 90
ere statistically significant, among which 5 out of 6 have posi-
ive signs. F-Tests showed cross-price effects are jointly significant
or the demand for on-trade wine and spirits, using a significance
evel of 0.05, and for on-trade beer, using a significance level of 0.1.
he magnitude of the estimated cross-price elasticities was  much
maller than that of the own-price elasticities. If we only focus on
entral estimates, most of the estimated cross-price elasticities of
n-trade demand with respect to off-trade prices are positive (15
ut of 25 in the top right corner of Table 3), which appears to indi-
ate some level of overall substitution effect, i.e., if prices fall in the
upermarkets people appear to spend more in the pubs and bars.
Using the base case FEMs, three alternative methods for creating
ubgroups were tested. Appendix 6 compares the estimated own-
rice elasticities using these methods and shows that these are
roadly similar. For example, the own-price elasticity for off-trade
eer was estimated to be −0.98 in the base case, −1.03 for the 96
ubgroups defined by 4 social groups, −1.12 for the 48 subgroups
efined by 2 regions, and −1.11 for the 96 subgroups defined by 4
100
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Table 2
Estimated coefficients, goodness-of-fit, and statistical tests for the fixed effects models of the demand for 10 beverage categories.
lnC(off-beer) lnC(off-cider) lnC(off-wine) lnC(off-spirits) lnC(off-RTDs) lnC(on-beer) lnC(on-cider) lnC(on-wine) lnC(on-spirits) lnC(on-RTDs)
lnP(off-beer) −0.980* (0.18) −0.189 (0.40) 0.096 (0.17) −0.368 (0.21) −1.092 (0.57) −0.016 (0.20) −0.050 (0.48) 0.253 (0.22) 0.030 (0.27) 0.503 (0.43)
lnP(off-cider) 0.065 (0.09) −1.268* (0.23) 0.118 (0.07) −0.122 (0.11) −0.239 (0.24) −0.053 (0.06) 0.093 (0.21) 0.067 (0.09) −0.108 (0.10) −0.194 (0.18)
lnP(off-wine) −0.040 (0.18) 0.736* (0.35) −0.384* (0.16) 0.363 (0.21) 0.039 (0.32) −0.245 (0.14) −0.155 (0.36) 0.043 (0.15) −0.186 (0.22) 0.110 (0.27)
lnP(off-spirits) 0.113 (0.11) −0.024 (0.30) 0.163 (0.10) −0.082 (0.17) −0.042 (0.29) 0.167 (0.10) 0.406 (0.23) 0.005 (0.14) 0.084 (0.15) 0.233 (0.29)
lnP(off-RTDs) −0.047 (0.05) −0.159 (0.11) −0.006 (0.04) 0.079 (0.06) −0.585* (0.27) −0.061 (0.04) 0.067 (0.14) 0.068 (0.07) −0.179* (0.09) 0.093 (0.16)
lnP(on-beer) 0.148 (0.20) −0.285 (0.43) 0.115 (0.20) −0.028 (0.23) 0.803 (0.52) −0.786* (0.28) 0.867 (0.68) 1.042* (0.38) 1.169* (0.36) −0.117 (0.50)
lnP(on-cider) −0.100 (0.09) 0.071 (0.15) 0.043 (0.08) 0.021 (0.14) 0.365 (0.21) 0.035 (0.13) −0.591* (0.23) 0.072 (0.11) 0.237* (0.12) 0.241 (0.20)
lnP(on-wine) −0.197 (0.12) 0.094 (0.22) −0.154 (0.14) −0.031 (0.17) −0.093 (0.32) −0.276 (0.18) −0.031 (0.26) −0.871* (0.15) −0.021 (0.16) −0.363 (0.20)
lnP(on-spirits) 0.019 (0.12) −0.117 (0.23) −0.027 (0.10) −0.280 (0.16) −0.145 (0.29) −0.002 (0.11) −0.284 (0.29) 0.109 (0.15) −0.890* (0.19) 0.809* (0.33)
lnP(on-RTDs) 0.079 (0.08) 0.005 (0.16) −0.085 (0.07) −0.047 (0.09) 0.369 (0.28) 0.121 (0.09) −0.394 (0.30) −0.027 (0.10) −0.071 (0.12) −0.187 (0.27)
lnIncome −0.074 (0.24) −0.133 (0.52) −0.156 (0.24) 0.795* (0.32) 0.530 (0.63) 0.409 (0.31) −0.165 (0.54) 0.264 (0.26) 0.592 (0.37) −0.418 (0.44)
Age  × age −0.001* (0.00) −0.002* (0.00) −0.001* (0.00) 0.000 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00) −0.001 (0.00) 0.000 (0.00) −0.001 (0.00) 0.001 (0.00)
%  Have kids −0.565* (0.23) −0.109 (0.39) −1.273* (0.37) −0.475 (0.24) −0.843 (0.61) −1.118* (0.19) −1.699* (0.53) −1.347* (0.28) −1.356* (0.28) −1.526* (0.37)
%  Married 0.938* (0.33) 0.863 (0.85) 0.692* (0.34) 0.161 (0.49) 1.498 (1.12) −0.412 (0.35) 2.021* (0.84) 0.462 (0.54) −0.819 (0.61) −0.737 (1.03)
%  Unemployed 0.638 (0.79) −2.114 (1.63) −0.044 (1.33) 0.414 (1.07) −0.410 (1.72) 1.455 (1.14) 0.502 (2.19) 1.196 (1.24) −0.801 (0.94) −1.662 (1.51)
%  Smoker 1.351* (0.45) 1.511 (0.81) 1.149* (0.44) 0.428 (0.66) 1.096 (1.24) 1.066* (0.42) 0.130 (1.00) 0.574 (0.50) 1.111 (0.60) 1.694* (0.83)
F-Test1  (p-value)a 1.06 (0.41) 1.12 (0.36) 1.03 (0.42) 1.16 (0.34) 1.85 (0.08) 1.99 (0.06) 1.10 (0.37) 2.16* (0.04) 2.16* (0.04) 1.46 (0.19)
F-Test2  (p-value)b 6.43* (0.00) 4.61* (0.00) 5.60* (0.00) 2.54* (0.04) 0.69 (0.63) 12.24* (0.00) 4.25* (0.00) 7.11* (0.00) 9.27* (0.00) 14.18* (0.00)
SSEc 45.57 171.29 51.46 80.77 248.03 50.26 283.67 68.32 102.06 166.09
Log-likelihood −96.79 −440.12 −129.72 −253.39 −496.32 −121.86 −562.65 −207.32 −317.30 −404.74
Hausman-test (p-value) 37.46* (0.03) 31.09 (0.12) 126.91* (0.00) 24.22 (0.39) 27.11 (0.25) 50.54* (0.00) 43.53* (0.00) 62.73* (0.00) 54.09* (0.00) 40.55* (0.01)
Remarks: The values in parentheses are standard errors.
a F-Test for cross-price effects.
b F-Test for age, % have children, married, unemployed and smoker.
c Residual sum of squares.
* p-Value <0.05.
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Table  3
Estimated own- and cross-price elasticities of off- and–on trade beer, cider, wine, spirits and RTDs in the UK.
Purchase
Off-beer Off-cider Off-wine Off-spirits Off-RTDs On-beer On-cider On-wine On-spirits On-RTDs
Price
Off-beer −0.980* −0.189 0.096 −0.368 −1.092 −0.016 −0.050 0.253 0.030 0.503
Off-cider 0.065 −1.268* 0.118 −0.122 −0.239 −0.053 0.093 0.067 −0.108 −0.194
Off-wine −0.040 0.736* −0.384* 0.363 0.039 −0.245 −0.155 0.043 −0.186 0.110
Off-spirits 0.113 −0.024 0.163 −0.082 −0.042 0.167 0.406 0.005 0.084 0.233
Off-RTDs −0.047 −0.159 −0.006 0.079 −0.585* −0.061 0.067 0.068 −0.179* 0.093
On-beer  0.148 −0.285 0.115 −0.028 0.803 −0.786* 0.867 1.042* 1.169* −0.117
On-cider −0.100 0.071 0.043 0.021 0.365 0.035 −0.591* 0.072 0.237* 0.241
On-wine −0.197 0.094 −0.154 −0.031 −0.093 −0.276 −0.031 −0.871* −0.021 −0.363
0.145
0.369
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aOn-spirits 0.019 −0.117 −0.027 −0.280 −
On-RTDs 0.079 0.005 −0.085 −0.047
* p-Value <0.05.
egions. This suggests that the estimated elasticities are reasonably
obust to different subgroup definitions.
. Discussion
This is the first study to utilise a pseudo-panel approach to esti-
ate price elasticities of demand for alcohol. The final base case
EMs enables estimation of own- and cross-price elasticities for
0 different beverage categories. This granularity is essential for
etailed analysis of pricing policies which can affect the various
everage categories differentially. The estimated elasticities are
ot directly comparable with most previous estimates because the
ata used is from recent (2001 to 2009) UK population surveys,
nd because the beverage categories included are more detailed
han most previous studies which tend not to separate cider and
TDs, or consider off- vs. on-trade differences. Nevertheless, the
stimated own-price elasticities are broadly in line with earlier
stimates. Three recent meta-analyses estimated that the simple
eans of reported elasticities are −0.45 to −0.83 for beer, −0.65
o −1.11 for wine and −0.73 to −1.09 for spirits (Fogarty, 2010;
allet, 2007; Wagenaar et al., 2009), while standard deviations and
anges of individual estimates for the 3 beverage types are 0.46 (−3
o 1.28), 0.51 (−3 to 0.82) and 0.37 (−4.65 to 0.37) for beer, wine
nd spirits respectively (Fogarty, 2010) which demonstrated signif-
cant variations in estimates. The simple average of beer, wine and
pirits own-price elasticities estimated from this study (e.g., aver-
ge of off- and on-trade beer for beer estimate) are −0.88, −0.63
nd −0.49 which are all within one standard deviation (as reported
y Fogarty (2010)) of any of the three mean estimates from meta-
nalyses. In the on-trade, a similar pattern is observed in this study
s in previous meta-analyses, in that beer appears to be less elastic
han wine or spirits. However, this pattern is not observed in the off-
rade, where it was found that beer is more elastic than wine and
pirits. Overall, the estimated own-price elasticities are broadly in
ine with historical estimates, and most modelled beverage types
re found to have significant negative elasticities suggesting the
seudo-panel approach is a valid technique for deriving alcohol
lasticities.
It is more challenging to compare the estimated cross-price elas-
icities with previous estimates, especially when the beverages are
eparated by off- and on-trade, because there are few existing stud-
es for comparison. Out of our 90 estimated cross-price elasticities,
nly 6 are statistically significant, which might be attributable to
hance effects. However, the estimation of cross-price elasticities
s still useful because: (1) the estimation of own-price elasticities
s improved by controlling for cross-price effects, and (2) they can
e jointly statistically significant as has been found in our study
or on-trade wine and spirits. The estimated cross-price elastici-
ies appear plausible regarding the expected signs and magnitude,
p
c
i
n −0.002 −0.284 0.109 −0.890* 0.809*
0.121 −0.394 −0.027 −0.071 −0.187
nd they enable quantified estimates of cross-price effects when
ppraising policy interventions.
There are several advantages to the pseudo-panel approach.
revious analyses applying cross-sectional models on cross-
ectional data (for example Collis et al., 2010) are likely to have
ubstantial problems with endogeneity. Those time-invariant vari-
bles that are omitted from the model and are correlated with
lcohol prices will be uncontrolled for in such studies. For exam-
le, quality preferences are likely to vary considerably between
ndividuals, affecting both price and quantity purchased, and
ross-sectional methods would wrongly attribute these variations
o prices. The FEM used in our base case substantially reduces
ndogeneity problems because all time-invariant independent
ariables, observed or not, are controlled for on the defined sub-
roup level. Another potential problem of using cross-sectional
ata relates to the observation interval. It has been observed that
he length of the observation interval (e.g., one week vs. one quar-
er) may  have a significant impact on the magnitude of the resulting
lasticity estimates, even for genuine panel data methods (Hill-
cManus et al., 2013), and it has been suggested that this could
e due to inventory behaviour (Fogarty, 2010). The LCF data has
n observation interval of two weeks; however the pseudo-panel
pproach solves this issue through the use of subgroup average pur-
hase quantities, rather than individual purchase quantities, thus
moothing out the short term (i.e., the two  week diary period)
rregular purchases that constitute inventory behaviour. The use
f subgroup average purchase quantities also avoids the problem
f excess zero alcohol purchasing observations in cross-sectional
ata (Collis et al., 2010; Purshouse et al., 2010).
Nevertheless, panel models cannot remove all endogeneity
roblems. Price variables could be endogenous due to simultane-
ty because not only is the purchase level dependent on the price,
ut also the price could potentially be dependent on the purchase
evel. It has been found that a heavy drinker who spends a big-
er proportion of their income on alcohol tends to choose ‘lower
uality’ beverages with low PPU (e.g., cheaper brand, larger con-
ainer); while a lighter drinker with similar income tends to choose
 ‘higher quality’ beverage with a higher PPU, perhaps for better
aste or a more-convenient container size (Gruenewald et al., 2006).
he LCF data does not provide brand or packaging data, therefore
he panel models have not controlled for the brand and packaging
references which may  change over time. The split of off- and on-
rade beverages and separation of cider and RTDs in this analysis
ay  alleviate the problem to some extent, but the issue remains
 concern. In this study, we used self-reported prices which is the
rice paid by individuals. In theory, elasticities are defined as the
hange in demand due to a change in price where the price implic-
tly means price faced, rather than price paid. As far as we  know,
o survey has attempted to collect primary data on price faced.
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owever, given current data and evidence, we are clear that the
seudo-panel approach is a substantial advance over, and a better
lternative to, cross-sectional methods.
When constructing subgroups in pseudo-panels, we assumed
hat the socioeconomic status (in the base case) and the region
eople live (in sensitivity analysis) do not generally change over
ime. While the validity of these assumptions may  be questioned,
e think they reasonably hold given the limited time period of
he data (2001–2009) and the large size of the regions (2 or 4
egions in UK). Furthermore, the similarity of the results and con-
lusions obtained from the base case and sensitivity analyses is
eassuring. Models tested in this study are static without the inclu-
ion of lagged dependent variables. It has been suggested that
he inclusion of lagged dependent variables may  compromise the
xplanatory power of other independent variables (Achen, 2012)
nd that a significant lagged effect of the dependent variable may
e due to omitted variables or measurement error bias rather than
 true lagged effect (McKinnish, 2002).
The key implication of this study for decision makers is that they
an utilise these elasticities to examine the effects of price-based
nterventions on alcohol purchasing and alcohol related harms
n the UK. The estimated elasticities allow detailed estimation of
everage-specific demand changes due to beverage specific price
hanges. This is appealing for appraising interventions which have
ifferential price impact on different beverage types such as min-
mum unit pricing which, by setting a floor to the retail price,
ill mostly affect cheap alcohol. The majority of the cheap alco-
ol sold in the UK is off-trade beer, cider, wine and sprites. The
stimated own-price elasticities indicate substantial decrease in
emand for these beverage types if their prices are increased, e.g.,
hrough minimum unit pricing and/or target excise duty increases.
iven the strong associations between alcohol consumption and a
ange of alcohol-related harms, the decrease in demand is likely
o translate into reduced mortality, morbidity and wider social
arms such as crimes, absence from work and harms to family
embers.
The pseudo-panel method could also be used to explore elas-
icities for population subgroups. We  have performed exploratory
nalyses to estimate separate elasticities for population subgroups
ith regard to purchase level (moderate vs. non-moderate pur-
hasers) and socioeconomic status (lower vs. middle/higher). We
plit the overall LCF dataset into individuals who are moderate pur-
hasers (i.e., ≤3 or 2 units per day for males/females, according
o the current UK drinking guidelines) and non-moderate pur-
hasers. Then FEMs are applied to the two datasets separately. The
stimated elasticities are presented in Appendix 7-1 and 7-2. For
he socioeconomic analysis, we split the LCF dataset into individ-
als with lower socioeconomic status and those with middle or
igher socioeconomic status. Then FEMs with 24 panel members
2 genders, 12 birth cohorts and no socioeconomic breakdown)
nd with 48 panel members (2 genders, 12 birth cohorts, and
iddle and higher socioeconomic groups) were used for the low
nd higher socioeconomic groups respectively. The estimated elas-
icities are presented in Appendix 7-3 and 7-4. These subgroup
nalyses are exploratory in nature as the sample size for panel
embers is smaller (in the case of moderate vs. non-moderate
urchaser analysis) and because the heterogeneity among panel
embers is reduced due to the smaller panel size (in the case of low
s. higher socioeconomic analysis). Therefore, caution is required
hen interpreting and applying these elasticities.
The pseudo-panel approach is generalisable and could easilye applied to different countries or settings where large sample
epeated cross-sectional data is available. The estimated elasticities
re UK-specific and some caution should be exercised if consider-
ng applying them to a different context. The method could also be
G
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xtended to a wider set of products which affect public health, for
xample tobacco or foods high in fat, salt and sugar.
Future research to link prices faced and prices paid would be
aluable if datasets could be obtained or constructed. Large scale
nd long-term individual-level longitudinal data would be hugely
eneficial for better estimates of price elasticities. If possible, such
ata could also include information regarding the branding and
ackaging information so that the issues around potential price
ndogeneity could be addressed in more detail.
In conclusion, this study has developed and implemented a
seudo-panel approach to estimate price elasticities of alcohol
emand using repeated cross-sectional data. This approach enables
ongitudinal aspects of the data available to be taken into account,
here previous detailed beverage specific estimates of price elas-
icities have tended to come from cross-sectional analyses with
heir associated caveats. The resulting estimates of own- and cross-
rice elasticities appear plausible and robust and could be used for
ppraising the estimated impact of price-based interventions in the
K.
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